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COMMENTS
OFFICIAL SYMBOLS: USE AND ABUSE
In the earlier years of our nation's independence and later during
the Civil War, the American flag became a symbol of unity around
which all patriots rallied. Today, the flag has become the emblem of
America's disunity, "and, in a land where once only wars abroad set
it fluttering in vast numbers, the caricature of a new conflict is raging
at home."'
Perhaps the most serious single incident of the campus unrest that
rocked the University of New Mexico in the spring of 1970 was the
"Flag Pole Incident." There, two groups, each with its own beliefs on
the Kent State killings and the invasion of Cambodia, clashed, and
two students were stabbed. It was not unique that the American flag
was the central issue of dispute, for throughout the nation students
gathered to demand that the flag be displayed at half-mast as a
memorial to those who had died. 1970 was a year of protests, of
unpopular wars, of unpopular administrations, of hippies and
yippies, of "silent majorities," of disunity at U.N.M. and across the
nation. And in the tug of war for the nation's will and soul, the flag
had somehow become the symbolic rope.
1970 was also a year of polarization of political thought. As the
"Middle Americans" decided to stand up and be counted, the youthful "Radicals" stepped up their activity. While the older generation
applied flag decals to their automobiles and hard hats, the young
brought the red, white, and blue to their rock festivals where they
slept under it, wore it, and blew their noses on it. But even those of
the younger generation who used the flag without restraint were very
serious indeed, even if they deliberately used shock tactics for effect,
for to them the flag represents what America should be, not what it
is. The flag has become the banner for two cultures, one looking
toward the past and the other toward the future, and the impact of
all this is that the flag, its use and abuse has become an important
political weapon.
It was only a matter of time until manufacturers realized the
potential of flag-orientated products. This "commercial fallout" resulted in a doubling in the sale of flags. "An entire generation of
novelty and boutique entrepreneurs has outfitted the counter-culture
with starred-and-striped pants, ties, ashtrays, shaving mugs, pillow
cases, pens and even, in the most tasteless exploitation of all, toilet
1. Time, July 6, 1970, at 8.
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paper." 2 And as most often happens, what the counter-culture
creates, the "basic-culture" adopts. Across the country people of all
ages display their beliefs, varied though they may be, by wearing and

displaying the stars and stripes.
Those in New Mexico who choose to express their emotional feel-

ing for the policies and politics of this country, regardless of their
political beliefs, by using or abusing the American flag face a greater
threat than the wrath of their political counter-parts. They face
arrest and conviction under N.M. Stat Ann. § 40A-21-4. The purpose

of this Comment is to examine the constitutionality of New Mexico's
statute concerning the improper use of official symbols, to examine

the lack of protection it affords all citizens of this state, and to
discuss the reasons why the act should be declared unconstitutional.

It is the position of this Comment that the act is vague, and that its
vagueness leads to abusive and discretionary enforcement. As the

statute is written, no citizen can be sure that he is not violating it,
and it is so broad that it chills the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms.
In addition to the existing federal law, 3 each state has its own

particular statute concerning desecration. It is important to note that

the federal government had, with but one exception,4 no criminal

statute making desecration a criminal offense until the enactment of
18 U.S.C. § 700' which was passed in July of 1968. Until this time
the burden was placed upon the states to handle cases of desecration,

and without exception each state has a flag desecration statute on its
books. Such statutes have been upheld as a proper exercise of the
2.
3.
4.
5.

Id.
36 U.S.C. § 171 etseq. (1964) and 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. V, 1970).
4 U.S.C. § 3 (Supp. V, 1970) applies exclusively to the District of Columbia.
§ 700. Desecration of the flag of the United States; penalties:
(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the United States
by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling upon it shall
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or
both.
(b) The term "flag of the United States" as used in this section, shall
include any flag, standard, colors, ensign, or any picture or representation of
either, or of any part or parts of either, made of any substance or represented
on any substance, of any size evidently purporting to be either of said flag,
standard, color, or ensign of the United States of America, or a picture or a
representation of either, upon which shall be shown the colors, the stars and
the stripes, in any number of either thereof, or of any part or parts of either,
by which the average person seeing the same without deliberation may believe
the same to represent the flag, standards, colors, or ensign of the United States
of America.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed as indicating an intent on the
part of Congress to deprive any State, territory, possession, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico of jurisdiction over any offense over which it would
have jurisdiction in the absence of this section.
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state's police power, as tending to prevent breaches of the peace, and
as upholding the dignity of the flag.' The question of state control
versus federal control over flag abuse was settled early in Halter v.
Nebraska." In the absence of federal legislation,
The state may exert some control in the interest of its own people;
and although the National flag of the United States is the emblem of
National sovereignity and a congressional enactment in regard to its
use might supersede state legislation in regard thereto, until Congress
does act, a state has power to prohibit the use of the National
flag... 8
The enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 700, however, did not eliminate the
state court's jurisdiction over desecration of the flag of the United
States. 9
Halter settled once and for all the question whether a state could
legislate in this area. As the case most often quoted in desecration
decisions, it represents the emotional foundation upon which the
various flag acts were enacted:
For that flag every true American has not simply an appreciation but
a deep affection. No American... ever looks upon it without taking
pride in the fact that he lives under this free government. Hence, it
has often occurred that insults to the flag have been the cause of war,
and indignities put upon it, in the presence of those who revere it,
0
have often been resented and sometimes punished on the spot."
As discussed later, most of our state courts have become so
emotionally fettered by the patriotic significance given the flag that
they are unable to visualize the danger imposed by flag statutes to
the First Amendment freedoms. Again, it was Halter which set the
tone for practically all later decisions:
One who loves the Union will love the State in which he resides, and
love both of the common country and of the state will diminish in
proportion as respect for the flag is weakened. Therefore a state will
be wanting in care for the well-being of its people if it ignores the fact
that they regard the flag as a symbol of their country's power and
prestige, and will be impatient if any open disrespect is shown
towards it.' 1
6. 36A C.J.S. Flag § 2 (1961).
7. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
8. Id.

9. 18 U.S.C. § 700(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
10. 205 U.S. at 41.
11. Id. at 42.

January 19711]

OFFICIAL SYMBOLS-USE AND ABUSE

355

Thus authorized to enact desecration statutes, the various states
proceeded to develop a great variety of laws covering the use and
abuse of the flags of both the state and the nation. It soon became
apparent that something had to be done to standardize the various
approaches taken by the states, and the Uniform Flag Act was
created in 1917."2 Nineteen states have enacted the Flag Act in toto,
and a great majority of the remainder have incorporated part of its
language. The penalties imposed under the various acts range from
$100 in New Mexico'" to $5,000 in Illinois,'" and from six months
12. Uniform Flag Act (1917).
An Act to prevent and punish the desecration, mutilation, defacement, and
improper use of the flag of the United States of America, and of this State,
and of any flag, standard, color, ensign, or shield authorized by law.
§ 1. Definition.-The words flag, standard, color, ensign or shield, as used in
this act, shall include any flag, standard, color, ensign or shield, or copy,
picture or representation thereof, made of any substance or represented or
produced thereon, and of any size, evidently purporting to be such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield of the United States or of this state, or a copy,
picture or representation thereof.
§ 2. Desecration.-No person shall, in any manner, for exhibition or display:
(a) place or cause to be placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design,
drawing, or advertisement of any nature upon any flag, standard, color, ensign
or shield of the United States or of this state, or authorized by any law of the
United States or of this state; or
(b) expose to public view any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield
upon which shall have been printed, painted, or otherwise produced, or to
which shall have been attached, appended, affixed, or annexed any such word,
figure, mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement; or
(c) expose to public view for sale, manufacture, or otherwise, or to sell,
give or have in possession for sale, for gift or for use for any purpose, any
substance, being an article of merchandise, or receptacle, or thing for holding
or carrying merchandise, upon or to which shall have been produced or attached any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield, in order to advertise,
call attention to, decorate, mark or distinguish such article or substance.
§ 3. Mutilation.-No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy,
trample upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag, standard,
color, ensign or shield.
§ 4. Exceptions.-This statute shall not apply to any act permitted by the
statutes of the United States (or of this state), or by the United States Army
and Navy regulations, nor shall it apply to any printed or written document or
production, stationery, ornament, picture or jewelry whereupon shall be
depicted said flag, standard, color, ensign or shield with no design or words
thereon and disconnected with any advertisement.
§ 5. Penalty.-Any violation of Section Two of this act shall be a
misdemeanor and punishable by a fine of not more than .......
dollars. Any
violation of Section Three of this act shall be punishable by a fine of not more
than .......
dollars, or by imprisonment of not more than .......
days, or
by both fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court.
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-21-4(C) (RepL 1964).
14. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 56Y, § 6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970).
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to five years." The federal statute states that a person
in jail'
"shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for more than
one year, or both."' 7

The histories of the flag acts of the several states reveal that they
were enacted for the purpose of preventing breaches of the peace
resulting from the improper use of and disrespect to the flag." 8 They
were designed with the intent of preventing acts which would shock

the public conscience, and the very essence of the statutory offense
of mutilating or casting contempt on the flag of the United States
was thought to be the publicity involved in the act.' 9
The early judicial history of the flag acts revolved around religious
issues of saluting the flag. 2 0 The case of West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette2 ' settled the troublesome issue by holding

that it was a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
make it compulsory for children to salute the American flag, regard-

less of whether the abstention from participation in he patriotic act
was the result of religious views.

2

After Barnette in 1943 there was

very little judicial activity concerning the desecration statutes. It is
not until the late 1960's that one is, again, able to find cases appearing on the subject. It is as though the statutes were forgotten and left
to lie dormant until called upon. The years immediately following

the war saw peace-time-Fourth-of-July-Patriotism at its height. The
Korean War tightened the strings of national unity. It was not until
the beginning of the Indochina war and the new cultural revolution
that the question of flag use and abuse returned to the fore.
Beginning around 1965 a new wave of abuse cases began to hit the
courts in all parts of the nation, and the tempo of the litigation has
increased since that time. The illegal use to which the flag has been

put has been quite varied,2 3 and in practically all the cases the
defendant has been found guilty of flag desecration.2

4

15. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-21-4(C) (Repl. 1964).
Ann. Stat. ch. 561/4, § 6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970)
16. Ill.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 700(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
18. People v. Von Rosen, 13 IlI. 2d 68, 147 N.E.2d 327 (1958).
19. State v. Peacock, 138 Me. 339, 25 A.2d 491 (1942).
20. Johnson v. State, 204 Ark. 476, 163 S.W.2d 153 (1942); Minersville School District
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
21. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
22. Id. at 634.
23. Wearing a shirt made from an American flag, Hoffman v. United States, 256 A.2d
567 (D.C. 1969); burning the flag, United States v. Ferguson, 302 F.Supp. 1111 (N.D. Cal.
1969); wearing a vest made from a flag, People v. Cowgill, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1969); posing
nude with the flag in a magazine article's photograph, People v. Keough, 305 N.Y.S.2d 961
(1969); removing the flag from a pole and tearing it, tying it to one's fingers and then
waiving it in the air with the fingers in a "V" position, Joyce v. United States, 259 A.2d 363
(D.C. 1969).
24. In all of the cases listed in note 23, supra, the defendant was found guilty.

January 19711]

OFFICIAL SYMBOLS-USE AND ABUSE

There have been two cases, however, in which the party charged
with the violation has been found not guilty. In the case of Commonwealth v. Janoff s decided in July of 1970, the court was able to use
the Pennsylvania desecration statute which exempted from its provisions any activity involving "patriotic or political demonstrations
or decorations." 2 6 With the provision it was easily reasoned that
Haugh's display of the flag (on which was printed "Make Love Not
War," at a demonstration protesting the Indochina involvement) was
protected, since he was obviously participating in a demonstration
concerning a political issue. The other, and perhaps more important,
case is Hodson v. Buckson.2' The Delaware statute was declared
25. 439 Pa. 212, 266 A.2d 657 (1970).
26. Pa.Stat. tit.
18, § 4211 (supp. 1970):
Desecration of flag
Whoever, in any manner, for exhibition or display, places or causes to be
placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing, or any advertisement,
of any nature, upon any flag, standard, color or ensign of the United States, or
of this State; or exposes or causes to be exposed to public view any such flag,
standard, color or ensign upon which shall be printed, painted or otherwise
placed, or to which shall be attached, appended, affixed or annexed, any
word, figure, mark, picture, design or drawing or any advertisement, of any
nature; or exposes to public view, manufactures, sells, exposes for sale, gives
away, or has in possession for sale or for gift, or for use, for any purpose, any
article or substance, being an article of merchandise or a receptacle of merchandise, upon which shall have been printed, painted, attached or otherwise
placed a representation of any such flag, standard, color or ensign, to advertise, call attention to, decorate, mark or distinguish, for the purpose of sale,
barter or trade, the article or substance on which so placed; or publicly or
privately mutilates, defaces, defiles or tramples upon, or casts contempt either
by words or act upon, any such flag, standard, color or ensign, is guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction, shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or undergo imprisonment for not more
than one (1) year, or both.
The words, flag, standard, color, or ensign, as used in this section, shall
include any flag, standard, color, ensign, or any picture or representation of
either thereof, made of any substance or represented on any substance, and of
any size, evidently purporting to be either of said flag, standard, color or
ensign of the United States of America or of this State, or a picture of a
representation of either thereof, upon which shall be shown the colors, or any
color, or any combination of colors, or either the stars or the stripes, or the
stars and the stripes, in any number of either thereof, or anything which the
person seeing the same, without deliberation, may believe the same to represent the flag, colors, standard, or ensign of the United States, or of this State.
This section does not apply to any act permitted by the statute of the
United States of America, or by the United States army and navy regulations;
nor in case where the Government of the United States has granted the use of
such flag, standard, color, or ensign as a trade-mark; nor does it apply to a
newspaper, periodical, book, pamphlet, circular, certificate, diploma, warrant,
or commission of appointment to office, ornamental picture, or badges, or
stationery for use in correspondence, on any of which shall be printed,
painted, or placed said flag, or representation thereof, disconnected from any
advertisement for the purpose of sale, barter, or trade: nor does it apply to
any patriotic or political demonstration or decorations.
27. 310 F.Supp. 528 (D. Del. 1970).
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unconstitutionally overbroad because of the chilling of the exercise
of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.
Hodson had continually flown the American flag in a position in-

ferior to that of the United Nations flag.
All of the above mentioned cases have involved desecration

that
statutes totally unlike the statute in New Mexico. One will find
28
flag.
American
the
of
use
the
to
refer
two New Mexico statutes
Only N.M.

Stat. Ann. § 40A-21-4 imposes a penalty for flag

desecration. It is this statute which this Comment contends is unconstitutional.
There is no case law interpreting this statute. An interview with an
2 9 revealed that the
Assistant District Attorney of Bernalillo County
Two recent
dismissed.
great percentage of violations are ultimately
cases, however, have challenged the New Mexico law. Both were
brought before a three judge federal panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
The second was argued
2281 et. seq. The first was dismissed."
25, 1970."1
September
on
before the New Mexico District Court

It is not the intention of this Comment to discuss the constitutionality of all desecration statutes, 3 2 for New Mexico's is unique in
both its approach and wording:
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-21-4. Improper Use of an Official Symbol.
The improper use of an official symbol consists of:
A. The use of the state or national flags for any purpose other
than the purposes for which it was designed by law.
B. Offering any insult by word or act to the state or national flag.
C. Using the state or national flags for advertising purposes by
painting, printing, or stamping, or otherwise placing thereon or
28. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 77-2-9 (Repl. 1968) provides that the Dep't of Education shall
adopt regulations concerning the appropriate displaying and care of the flag of the United
States.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-21-4 (Repl. 1964) provides:
Improper use of official symbols.-Improper use of official symbols consists
of:
A. the use of the state or national flags for any purpose other than the
purposes for which it was designed by law;
B. offering any insult by word or act to the state or national flags; or
C. using the state or national flags for advertising purposes by painting,
printing, stamping or otherwise placing thereon or affixing thereto any name
or object not connected with the patriotic history of the nation or the state.
Whoever commits improper use of official symbols is guilty of a petty
misdemeanor.
29. Interview with William Short, Assistant District Attorney of Bernalillo County, in
Albuquerque, Oct. 8, 1970.
30. Russel v. State, No. 8086 Civil (D.N.M. 1969).
31. Mehren v. State, No. 8618 Civil, (D.N.M. 1970).
32. For a discussion of this topic see, Note, Freedomof Speech and Symbolic Conduct:
The Crime of FlagDesecration, 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 71 (1970).
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affixing thereto any name or object not connected with the patriotic
history of the nation or state.
Whoever commits improper use of official symbols is guilty of a
petty misdemeanor.
The law is totally unlike that found in the Model Flag Act3 3 and has
very little in common with either the federal act or the various state
acts. There are basically three reasons why this law should be declared unconstitutional.
I
LACK OF STANDARDS: FAILURE TO INCORPORATE BY REFERENCE
It is obvious that Subsection "A" sets forth no standards by which
to measure what constitutes flag desecration. There is absolutely no
standard of proscribed conduct. It is a general rule of law that a
general reference to other laws will not in itself make an act vague or
insufficient,3 provided the reference statute and those statutes
referred to are clear.3" The Supreme Court of Iowa has held that
where a reference statute is employed, the language of the referring
act should indicate what is in the legislative mind, and that it is
essential that this be done with reasonable certainty.3 6 It cannot be
denied that "use for any purpose other than the purposes for which
it was designed by law" is vague and uncertain. The only other New
Mexico law is inapplicable in situations imposing criminal
sanctions. 3 I Corpus Juris Secundum states that:
Where reference is made to some unknown and wholly indeterminative law, or if the reference to an existing law is so general and

the intent so uncertain that it is impossible to determine what law is
referred to, the act becomes too vague and uncertain to be
effectual.38
It could well be argued that the federal statute is the "law"
referred to in § 40A-21-4(A). And under many circumstances the
courts could so construe. There is, however, one problem. The New
Mexico statute was adopted in 1963. It was not until five years later,
in 1968, that 18 U.S.C. § 700 was enacted. To incorporate by
reference future statutes is unconstitutional:
33. Uniform Flag Act.
34. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Mullaney, 180 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1950).
35. The Brazil, 134 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1943).
36. Bergeson v. Pesch, 254 Iowa 223, 117 N.W.2d 431 (1962).
37. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 77-2-9 (Repl. 1968).
38. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 68(e) (1953) See Savage v. Wallace, 165 Ala. 572, 51 So. 605
(1910); Rutledge v. City of Greenville, 155 S.C. 520, 152 S.E. 700 (1930).

NEW MEXICO LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 1

Statutes adopting existing Federal rules, regulations, or statutes, are

rules, regulations, or
valid but attempts to adopt future 3Federal
9
statutes are unconstitutional and void.

Other federal laws exist on the subject of the use of the American
flag. 4 One could reasonably presume that by enactment of the
criminal statute prohibiting the improper use of the flag, the State of
New Mexico has proscribed behavior and incorporated the expression
of proper usage found in 38 U.S.C. § 171 et seq. This statute was
enacted prior to § 40A-21-4, but it has been repeatedly held that
this particular federal law does not proscribe conduct; indeed, the
statute itself so states.4 1 It relates solely to what is customary usage
of the flag. Furthermore, it fails to state "the purposes for which it
[the national flag] was designed by law."
Title 36 is not intended to proscribe behavior. It is fashioned as an
expression of prevalent custom regarding the display of the
American flag. 4 2
Nor can it be said that the legislature intended to incorporate
existing state law as the standard by which to proscribe conduct. No
reference is made to any state nor to any statute. The minimum
requirement for incorporation by reference is that there be
4
"adequate reference" to the federal statute in the state statute,
and the rule is the same for state statutes referring to the statutes of
another state.4 4 The rule is:
...if the reference to an existing law is so general and the intent so
uncertain that it is impossible to determine what law is45referred to,
the act becomes too vague and uncertain to be effectual.
There is yet another reason why Subsection "A" of the New
Mexico statute could not be interpreted as incorporating by reference either federal or state law. Article IV, section 18 of the New
Mexico constitution prohibits reference by title only. The section,
39. State v. Urquhart, 50 Wash. 2d 131, 310 P.2d 261, 265 (1957). See also Dawson v.
Hamilton, 314 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1958); Nostrand v. Balmer, 53 Wash.2d 460, 335 P.2d 10
(1959); United States ex. rel. Kessler v. Mecur Corp., 83 F.2d 178, affg, 13 F. Supp. 742,
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 576 (1936); United States ex. rel. Boyd v. McMurtry, 5 F. Supp. 515
(1933); Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 217 F.Supp. 210
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 326 F.2d 841, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1963).
40. 36 U.S.C. § 171 etseq. (1964).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 700(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
42. State of Delaware v. Hodson, 265 F.Supp. 308, 310 (D. Del. 1967).
43. General Installation Co. v. University City, 379 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. 1964).
44. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 72(a) (1953).
45. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 68(e) (1953). See also Road District No. 1 v. Sellers, 142 Tex.
528, 180 S.W.2d 138 (1944); Application of Toronto Pipe Line Co., 167 Neb. 201, 92
N.W.2d 554 (1958).
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however, states that "no law shall be revised or amended... by reference ...

to title only." § 40A-21-4 was not a revision or amend-

ment. But the New Mexico supreme court in Middle Rio Grande
Water Users Ass'n v. Rio Grande Conservancy District' 6 stated,
"[W]e are firmly committed to the doctrine that only procedural
law may be adopted by reference." 4
Thus, Subsection "A" of the New Mexico act is unconstitutionally
vague in that it fails to proscribe by reference a reasonably certain
standard of conduct.
II
IMPRACTICALITY OF APPLICATION
The failure of the New Mexico Legislature to legislate by reference
is, perhaps, the soundest approach which could be taken in attacking
the constitutional validity of § 40A-21-4. Subsection "A" clearly
fails in its purpose. In addition, a court is far more likely to buy the
referability argument than one based on an infringement of First
Amendment freedoms. This is apparent from the great majority of
recent convictions which have rejected any First Amendment
argument. 48 This is not to say that the First Amendment arguments
are without merit, but given the purpose of the desecration statutes,
the emotional appeal involved, and the political considerations, it is
difficult for a court to reverse the conviction of one who has used
the flag in an abusive manner. Thus, the courts, and where circumstances permit, the smart lawyer, have placed their major emphasis
on statutory loopholes or other existing means in order to justify
reversal. 4 9
Because of the indefinite wording of the New Mexico statute, it is
vulnerable to yet another argumentative approach-the law is
incapable of a just and practical application. There is a long line of
New Mexico cases which stands for the proposition that "A penal
statute should define the act necessary to constitute an offense with
such certainty that a person who violates it must know that his act is
criminal when he does it."' 0 State v. Prince involved the then
existing embezzlement statute. In declaring the statute unconstitutional the court said:
Under its terms there is no defense for simple conversion, and to
46. 57 N.M. 287, 258 P.2d 391 (1953).
47. 57 N.M. at 298 (1953).
48. See note 23 supra.
49. A good example of this "avoidance principle" is Commonwealth v. Janoff, 439
Pa.212, 266 A.2d 657 (1970).
50. State v. Prince, 52 N.M. 15, 18, 189 P.2d 993, 996 (1948).
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make an act, innocent in itself, a crime, and criminals of those who

might perchance fall within its interdiction, is inconsistent with the

law. The statute is uncertain in its meaning, vague and indefinite. A
person charged thereunder is deprived of due process of law, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States.' 1
It is submitted that the then existing embezzlement statute5 2 was far
more descriptive and definite, far more capable of application, than
§ 40A-21-4. Subsection "A" provides absolutely no definition of
what an "improper use" might be. Subsection "B" says that "offering any insult" to the flag is punishable, but what constitutes an
"insult"? Prince involved a statute which employed the terms
"embezzle," "fraudulently convert," and "secret with intent to
embezzle". All these terms were considered by the court to be
inadequate in defining the crime of embezzlement, yet each of the
terms has a long history of judicial interpretation and application.
The New Mexico supreme court said that, "To sustain the statute, we
would supply by intendment, words of limitation, and this would be
judicial legislation." ' ' The embezzlement law was unconstitutional,
and yet no specific act or omission is proscribed in New Mexico's flag
statute other than "insult," a term so open to various interpretations
that one could never be sure when he was in violation of the law
prohibiting the improper use of official symbols. To fall within the
scope of the statute one would suppose that an "insult" must clearly
comprise some act which does not fall within those "purposes for
which it [the flag] was designed by law." What are those purposes?
Certainly men could disagree in answering this question. Since the
statute is written without reference to what foreign law is to be
applied or to what acts constitute an "insult," one needs to fall back
on his own views developed from childhood and life experiences.
When confronted with a flag abuse case, an arresting officer is placed
in the position of applying the only standard made available to him
by this statute-his own personal standard.
The power to define crimes, however, is a legislative function, not
a function of the courts or the police.5 4 It is the court's function to
determine whether the defendant violated the statute as written, not
51. 52 N.M. at 19 (1948).
52. N.M. Code 1915, § 1543. "If any person who shall be entrusted with any property
which may be the subject of larceny, shall embezzle or fraudulently convert to his own use,
or shall secret with intent to embezzle or fraudently convert to his own use any such
property, he shall be deemed guilty of larceny."
53. 52 N.M. at 20, 189 P.2d at 998 (1948).
54. State v. Allen, 77 N.M. 433, 423 P.2d 867 (1967); State v. Shoprite Foods, Inc., 74
N.M. 55, 390 P.2d 437 (1964).
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to interpret a vague statute so that the defendant can be included
under it. It is a well established rule of law in New Mexico that
"Penal statutes are strictly construed and should be of sufficient
certainty so that a person will know his act is criminal when he does
it."' ' The statutory wording of Subsections "A" and "B" clearly
falls within the purview of State v. Ortiz s 6 "If there be any
ambiguity or doubt concerning the meaning of a criminal statute, it
will be construed against the state which enacted it and in favor of
the accused." ' ' The statute provides no standard. To punish an
individual the court must of necessity establish its own definition of
"insult" and "purposes ...designed by law." This is a legislative
function, and any criminal statute which forces the court to create
its own definitions is unconstitutionally vague, if not overbroad.
Similarly, statutes should not be defined by the whim of the
police. A vague statute allows the police to wield unlimited discretionary powers in its enforcement or application. A vague statute
is "grossly susceptible of overreaching federal constitutional guarantees by lending itself for ready use by officials against those
deemed to merit their displeasure." ' 8 It leads to "government by the
moment-to-moment opinions of a policeman on his beat."" 9
It is significant to note that all five of the arrests which took place
in the Albuquerque area in the summer of 1970 involved only those
who appeared to be "hippies." The person's appearance was a prime
factor in determining the extent of his improper use of an official
symbol. When one considers that under § 40A-21-4 the application
of flag decals to one's car is a violation of Subsection "A" it is
strange that no arrests have been based on this misuse. 36 U.S.C.
§ 175(a) states that "when a flag is displayed on a motor car the
staff shall be firmly fixed to the chassis." This clearly indicates that
(1) the flag must be displayed from a staff, and (2) it can only be
attached to the staff. As defined in 18 U.S.C. § 700 "flag of the
United States" includes ". . . any picture or representation ... made
of any substance or represented on any substance, of any size
evidently purporting to be either of said flag. . ." Under these
federal laws the flag decal is obviously not a "use ...for which it
[the flag] was designed by law." To be sure, the New Mexico statute
should be applied only in flagrant cases of an abusive use, but a
55. State v. Collins, 80 N.M. 499, 502, 458 P.2d 225 (1969). See also State v. Clark, 80
N.M. 340, 455 P.2d 844 (1969); State v. Couch, 52 N.M. 127, 193 P.2d 405 (1948); State v.
Buford, 65 N.M. 51, 331 P.2d 1110 (1958).
56. 78 N.M. 507, 433 P.2d 92 (1967).
57. 78 N.M. at 510 (1967).
58. Baker v. Bindner, 274 F.Supp. 658, 662 (W. D. Ky. 1967).
59. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965).
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police officer could easily apply the law to a flag decal situation,
especially if the situation warranted it, a situation motivated by an
officer's dislike of a person's personal appearance or a similar cause.
The fact that a policeman does not is a matter of his personal discretion, which may or may not be justified. But when that discretion
is forced to apply non-existent standards which have the potential of
depriving an individual of his personal liberty, the discretionary application of vague standards is a violation of due process. The effect
of this statute is to inhibit patriotic expression, since one can never
be sure that he will not cross that line the police officer has subjectively drawn while enforcing the law.
Another example of the impractical nature of the law is its failure
to include intent to actually desecrate the flag as a basis of a violation. In People v. Radich6 1 the court in construing a New York
statute said that the element of intent was not essential to conviction
of violating flag desecration statutes. Certainly, some criminal
statutes, those malum in se, do not require a specific intent on the
part of the individual charged with a violation. It is submitted, however, that § 40A-21-4 is not malum in se in character, but rather
malum prohibitum, and as such requires that intent is a necessary
prerequisite. Intent to desecrate the flag would be difficult to define
in all instances. This is one reason why other states of the union and
the federal government have defined desecration as "knowingly
cast[ing] contempt upon any flag of the United States by publicly
mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning or trampling... 61 With the
possible exception of "defiling" 6 2 each act enumerated in the federal statute presupposes a definite manifestation of intent. While not
perfect, these standards which the federal laws establish are an attempt to circumscribe the area within which acts (in the case of
federal law, intentional acts) of desecration will be prosecuted. It is
often the case with laws like desecration statutes that they are
selectively enforced. The citizen who accidently drops the flag while
taking it down will not be arrested, nor will the Cub Scout who uses
the flag as a neck handkerchief as part of his uniform. There is no
intent to desecrate. But, the young radical who accidently drops the
flag while carrying it, or who wears a tee-shirt on which is printed
stars and stripes presents a different situation. It is highly likely that
the law will be selectively enforced against such an individual regard60. 308 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1970).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 700(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
62. Hodsdon v. Buckson, 310 F.Supp. 528 (D. Del. 1970), has held that the Delaware
statute, Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 532 (1953), "whoever publicly mutilates, defaces, defiles,
defies, tramples upon or casts contempt by either word or act ... shall be fined..." is
unconstitutionally vague.
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less of his intent to actually or knowingly desecrate the flag. Thus,
without standards which require that there by an actual manifestation of an intent to desecrate, selective enforcement becomes a
powerful and dangerous weapon.
The standards set forth in New Mexico's law can easily be used to
circumvent the intent requirement, as indeed it was, in State v.
Mehrens.6 I Again, the New Mexico law is clear on this subject:
Generally speaking, when an act is prohibited and made punishable

by statute only, the statute is to be construed in the light of the
common law and the existence of a criminal intent is to be regarded
64
as essential, although the terms of the statute do not require it.
One would assume that "insult" presupposes some measure of
intent. It is important to note that the federal act was specifically
designed to include intent. 6 ' Thus, in the federal law, intent is
essential. Should § 40A-21-4 be declared constitutional, and
assuming that the New Mexico statute was construed to refer to the
federal act, an intent to desecrate the flag would be a necessary
prerequisite in applying both Subsections "A" and "B". Without
standards, however, like those imposed in 18 U.S.C. § 700, and
when coupled with selective enforcement, the determination of
intent is left, again, to the whim of the court and the police, a result
which holds the potential of abusive and subjective enforcement,
and a denial of due process. In short,
A law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process clause if it is
so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the
conduct it prohibits, or leaves the judges and jurors free to decide,
without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is
not in each particular case. 66
To apply the law, the policeman is forced to employ a statute
virtually without standards, a criminal statute which should be
specific in its definition of the crime. The courts are then forced to
63. Criminal Docket A38857 Magistrate Court of the Bernalillo District of the State of
New Mexico (1970). Mr. Mehrens was given a headband composed of leather thongs and an
American flag by a friend. He testified that he was neither aware that he was violating a law
by wearing the headband, nor that he personally placed the flag in the condition it was
found in when he was arrested. He was found guilty of flag desecration and sentenced to the

maximum of six months in the county jail.
64. State v. Shedoudy, 45 N.M. 516, 524, 118 P.2d 280 (1941). See also State v.
Blacklock, 23 N.M. 251, 167 P. 714 (1917).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 700(a) (Supp. V, 1970). See Hearings on H.R. 271 Concerning
Desecration of the FlagBefore Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, at 324-46 (1967).
66. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-3 (1966).
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create standards in determining the particular outcome of each
case-a legislative function. In short, the law is impractical, if not
virtually impossible, to enforce with any degree of continuity and
justice.
III
FLAG DESECRATION IS "SYMBOLIC SPEECH" PROTECTED BY THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
A recent examination of this proposition has concluded that:
... [W] hen first amendment claims are raised in opposition to
government prohibition of conduct alleged to be symbolic speech,
the proper inquiry is to determine if there is in fact a communicative
element. Whenever there is, and it should not be difficult to recognize, the first amendment applies to the communicative element and
it will either protect it or not depending upon the extent to which
the conduct's nonspeech element infringes upon a legitimate government interest.6 7
The first stone in the defense that desecration is symbolic expression
protected by the first amendment was laid down by the Supreme
Court in Stromberg v. California68 in 1931. The Court has not
stopped adding to it since. The Stromberg case declared unconstitutional a California statute which forbade the display of a red flag
or banner. The court held that the display of a red flag was a means
of political discussion and expression protected by the First Amendment. Thus, we have the proposition that the display of a flag or
banner cannot be prohibited. But where the flag is the flag of the
United States, historically, a different result has been reached. In
order to determine why or why not the American flag should be
given special protection at the expense of First Amendment rights,
two questions need to be asked. First, what constitutes "speech" as
contemplated by the First Amendment, and, second, what power or
authority of government exists to control symbolic speech?
A. What Acts Are Included in Freedom of Speech?
It is obvious that "pure speech" vocal communication unaccompanied by any other form of expression, is protected by the
First Amendment. The Supreme Court has not, however, limited the
definition to pure speech, and an examination of the cases shows
that the act of flag desecration can be and should be included under
the penumbra of the First Amendment.
As noted earlier, Stromberg struck down a statute which made it
67. Flag Desecration,supra note 32, at 87.

68. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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unlawful to display a red flag or banner as a symbol or emblem of
opposition to organized government or as an invitation or stimulus to
anarchistic action. A long series of cases since Stromberg supports
the proposition that "speech" may be symbolic and still be entitled
to protection. In Brown v. Louisiana6 9 the Court was faced with a
statute which made peaceful demonstrations unlawful. The court
said that "the freedom of speech protections of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth are not confined to verbal expression." The
statute was declared unconstitutional.
Brown was cited in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Comool
District,7 0 a case involving a regulation prohibiting the wearing of
arm bands. The Court agreed with the District Court decision:
"[T] he District Court recognized that the wearing of an armband for
the purpose of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act
'7
1
that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
Tinker recognized that the wearing of an armband, as a symbolic act,
". was closely akin to 'pure speech' which, we have repeatedly
held is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment."'
Similarly, other acts, nonverbal in nature, have been included under first amendment protection, such as peaceful demonstrations 7 ' and solicitation. 7 4
Despite these recognitions, the question arises as to whether
symbolic conduct or expression is afforded the same or a lesser degree of protection afforded speech. The answer turns, in part, upon
the case of United States v. O'Brien.75 O'Brien was charged with
burning his draft card, an act which he claimed was a symbolic form
of expression which should be constitutionally protected. The Court
took the position that: "we cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intended thereby to express
an idea. ' 7 6 The court then proceeded to assume that there might
69. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
70. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
71. Id. at 505. Cf West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
72. 393 U.S. at 505-6 (1961). See also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), which
held that New York could not constitutionally punish a person for uttering words ("we
don't need no damn flag," and "if they let that happen to Meredith we don't need an
American flag") which cast contempt upon the flag. The court expressly refused to rule on
Street's burning of the American flag. It did, however, recognize four governmental interests
which might conceivably justify conviction. These are discussed more fully below.
73. Landry v. Daley, 280 F.Supp. 938 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
74. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
75. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
76. 391 U.S. at 376 (1968).
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have been a communicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct and established criteria for governmental regulation of such conduct." ' The
effect of O'Brien has been summarized:
The questions resulting from O'Brien, caused by the Court's assumption of communication as an element of O'Brien's conduct, by
the juxtaposition of speech and nonspeech, and by the creation of a
test to measure governmental interests, can all be answered from the
opinion itself. What emerges from an analysis of O'Brien is first the
conclusion that when a first amendment claim is raised to protect
conduct alleged to be symbolic expression, the Court's initial inquiry
should be, and indeed actually is, to determine if there is a communicative aspect to the conduct. This in fact is where the O'Brien
Court began, although it chose to assume an affirmative answer
rather than resolve the question analytically. Had it done so, however, and found no communicative aspect, then of course the first
amendment would be inapplicable. If there is a communicative
aspect to the conduct, the next conclusion 0 'Brien requires is that
despite the possible contrary inference, the first amendment protects
such conduct to the same extent that it protects speech and the
same standards that would be applied to determine if speech may be
constitutionally restricted are applied to the communicative aspect
of the conduct. This conclusion becomes clear when it is recognized
that the test the Court devised for application to conduct wherein
'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined, in order to determine if there is a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element which can justify the incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms, is no departure from the
test the Court employed in Street to determine if speech itself can
be limited." 7 8
The touchstone of the proposition that desecration is a form of
constitutionally protected expression rests with the premise that
when the symbolic conduct in question involves the use or abuse of
the American flag, a communicative element exists. Barnette7 9 supports this contention. "There is no doubt that, in connection with
the pledges, the flag salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a
primitive but effective way of communicating ideas." 8 0 Barnette
denied the government the power to force children in the public
schools to communicate their respect for the flag by saluting it. It
was considered an infringement of the freedom of speech, or rather
the freedom not to speak. "It logically follows that a public act of
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 377.
Flag Desecration,supra note 32, at 77.
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
319 U.S. at 632 (1943).
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flag desecration which clearly expresses disrespect for the flag is
equally recognizable as a form of utterance as is the flag salute which
expresses respect for the flag."' Clearly then, desecration of the
American flag is a form of communication, albeit symbolic, which
should fall within the protection of the First Amendment.
The critical factor is the communicative aspect of the symbolic
expression. There is a great difference, however, between the person
who desecrates the flag at a political demonstration and another who
simply wears the American flag as a headband. The first is obviously
an overt expression. The second is a more subtle form of communication. The analysis offered by the Note in the Arizona Law Review 8 2
indicates that protection should be offered only when there is a
communicative aspect of the conduct involved. The problem with
this approach is that the definitional foot-work involved in determining what constitutes a "communicative aspect" has the potential
of creating as formidable barriers to this form of expression as those
now imposed. A public manifestation of discontent or disrespect is,
under this analysis, something completely different than a personal
manifestation. All the arrests which took place in Albuquerque in the
Summer of 1970 involved a nonpolitical personal expression. The
wearing of a headband made from a flag and given to the wearer by a
friend8 3 represents a nonpolitical, interpersonal declaration of
friendship. Yet a Bernalillo County Magistrate Judge saw fit to
determine that wearing the American flag, in a tattered condition,
was a "defilement" of that flag and punishable.
From a constitutional point of view it could be argued that the
communicative aspect of desecration at a political rally should be
protected. However, it could be said that when such a communicative element is lacking so is the First Amendment's protection. 8 4 To
require a communicative intent or the lack of it and leave it simply at
that establishes a vague and broad criterion-a situation that is no
better than we have now.
The only suitable solution is to shed the protective barrier with
which we have clothed the American flag, and realize that the flag is,
in essence, no different than the red flag Mrs. Stromberg displayed,
and no different than the black armbands worn by the student,
Tinker.
81. Flag Desecration, supra note 32, at 80.
82. Supra note 32.
83. Supra note 63.
84. United States v. Ferguson, 302 F.Supp. 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1969); People v. Cowgill, 78
Cal. Rptr. 853 (1969).
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B. What Authority Exists To Protect The Flag From Abuse?
the various flag desecration statutes
As previously mentioned, 8
are justified on the grounds that the state has, through its police
powers, the duty to regulate the use of the state's and the nation's
official symbols in order to preserve the public order and tranquility.
As for the federal act, it has been held that: "Surely the government
has a substantial, genuine, and important interest in protecting the
8
flag from public desecration by contemptuous conduct." 6 A great
deal of case law has gradually developed into what amounts to a
myth concerning the sanctity of the American flag. When one cuts
through this veneer, peels away the interests of the sovereign, the
emotional concepts involved, and the bias and prejudices of those
administering the law one arrives at the basic reason for enacting
desecration statutes-political suppression of ideas which are in opposition to current governmental policies and the symbolic expression of that opposition. The first act of a victorious army is to
remove and destroy the fallen enemy's flag and replace it with one's
own. The first act of a new or emerging government is to create its
own flag and destroy the old one. To strike home with one's political
dissent, employ the use and abuse the opposition's official symbols.
Then the question becomes: Is there a legitimate governmental
interest in protecting the flag at the expense of constitutionally protected freedoms?
In holding that the federal and state government could not constitutionally punish a person for uttering words which cast contempt
on the United States flag, the Supreme Court, in Street v. New
York, 8 ' employed the four-part test set forth in O'Brien:
We think it clear that a governmental regulation is sufficiently
justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest. 8 8
The Supreme Court in Street declined to reach the issue of whether a
statute prohibiting physical desecration of the American flag in public is constitutionally valid. It did decide that a statute which in part
85. Supra notes 6, 18.
86. Hoffman v. United States, 256 A.2d 567, 569 (D.C. 1969).

87. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
88. 391 U.S. at 377 (1968).
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forbade the casting of contempt by words was unconstitutional.' 9 In
making this determination the court concluded that the four tests for
governmental regulation of that type of conduct could not be met.
In doing so the Court said:
We have no doubt that the constitutionally guaranteed 'freedom to
be intellectually ...diverse or even contrary' and even the 'right to
differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order,' encompass the freedom to express publicly one's opinions about our
flag, including those opinions which are defiant or contemptuous. 9 0
The Court went on to say:
We add that disrespect for our flag is to be deplored no less in these
vexed times than in calmer periods of our history.9 1 Nevertheless,
we are unable to sustain a conviction that may have rested on a form
of expression, however distasteful, which the Constitution tolerates
and protects.

It is submitted that an act of physical descration, as well as a verbal
act of disrespect, fails to meet the four requirements set forth in
O'Brien and Street.
First, the regulation must be within the constitutional power of
the government. In O'Brien this test was met by concluding that the
act requiring that all eligible men carry a draft card 9 2 was a necessary and proper exercise of the government's authority to raise and
maintain an army. In a desecration case the fulfillment of this first
requirement necessarily depends on the fulfillment of the other
three, for if they fail by definition the regulation is unconstitutional.
Second, the regulation of conduct must further an important or
substantial governmental interest. The prime interest has been, traditionally, the preservation of public' order or the prevention of
breaches of the peace. Not one, however, of the reported cases, nor
any of the instances arising in New Mexico, have involved a breach of
the peace. All arrests were based on desecration only. Yet the judges
who must administer the law are forced to fall back on this justification in support of their decisions and in answer to the challenges to
the law. 9" However,

In order for the state ... to justify prohibition of a particular ex89. Thus N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-21-4(B) (Repl. 1964), "offering
word .. ,." is unconstitutional.
90. 394 U.S. at 593-4 (1969).
91. See Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
92. 50 App. U.S.C. § 462 (Supp. IV, 1969).
93. People v. Radich, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1970).

any insult by
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pression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. 9 4

Should the government, state or federal, choose to rely on the
justification that desecration laws are meant to prevent breaches of
the peace, they should wait until a breach occurs or is likely to
occur. This requirement would serve two purposes; (1) it would
insure that harrassment would be kept to a minimum since only a
few cases would involve an actual breach, and (2) it would then
constitute a valid and reasonable governmental interest. The
potential of a disruption of public order is no greater when a person
physically abuses the flag than when one verbally abuses it, an act
now constitutionally protected by the Street decision. It is important
to remember that:
The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends
on free discussion. The right to speak freely and promote diversity
of ideas and programs is, therefore, one of the chief distinctions that
sets us apart from totalitarian regimes. Accordingly, a function of
free speech is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.
It should be protected unless likely to produce a clear and present
danger of serious substantive evil that arises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.9 5There is no room in our Constitution for a more restrictive view.

To be sure, acts of desecration are repugnant to many. But the
statement that, "....

the government has a substantial, genuine and

important interest in protecting the flag from public desecration and
contemptuous conduct" 9 6 by no means gives the government,
whether state or federal, the right to suppress expressions of displeasure when the public safety is not in jeopardy. Nor does the
justification that, "respect for our flag as a symbol of our country is
a part of our way of life and disrespect constitutes an offense against
our laws." 9" The last quote was taken from a case in which the
defendant refused to salute the American flag because of religious
reasons. No doubt the same emotional appeal and disgust accom94. 393 U.S. at 509 (1969).
95. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). Cf Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940).
96. Supra note 86.
97. Boiling v. Superior Court, 133 P.2d 803, 809 (Wash. 1943).
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panied instances of failure to salute the flag that follow the desecration of the flag, but the requirement that one must salute the flag has
been declared unconstitutional. In justifying its decision in Barnette
the Court, speaking of the Bill of Rights, said:
To enforce those rights today is not to choose weak government
over strong government. It is only to adhere as a means of strength

to individual freedom of mind in preference to officially disciplined
uniformity for which history indicates a disappointing and disastrous
end. 9 "

Thus, it is submitted that there is no important or substantial interest
involved in desecration statutes, other than the interest of suppressing political dissent or diluting it by removing the emotional or
phychological impact of dissent. One or a thousand instances of flag
desecration, whether they be the burning of a flag at a political rally
or the wearing of a red, white, and blue tie, will not jeopardize the
stability of this nation. Where a substantial and imminent threat to
public safety exists 9 9 the enforcement of statutes prohibiting certain
acts with respect to the flag may be justified, but only in those
instances.
The third test, that the government interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, cannot be met by the desecration
statutes now in effect. As pointed out above, the primary purpose
and effect of these statutes is to inhibit the expression of political
discontent. It has been successfully argued in the draft card cases
that the statute forbidding the burning of a draft card was an apparently narrow means of protecting the government's interest, i.e.,
the interest of insuring a continuing availability of men for the armed
services. Similarly, it has been argued that: ".

.

. even if burning of

the flag were accepted as speech, prohibition of the act would not
deprive the 'speaker' of an audience or other means of reaching an
audience."' 0 0 This is assuming, first, that there is a substantial
governmental interest. Secondly, this reason is inadequate. It would
be just as easy to maintain that it is permissible to prohibit oral
defamation of the nation and the flag because the newspapers are an
adequate means of achieving the same result.
Arresting only those who actually cause a breach of the peace is an
''appropriately narrow means" of protecting the government's
interest.
98. 319 U.S. at 637 (1943).
99. Where the burning of the flag poses a fire hazard to private or public property, or
where there is an actual or substantial threat of public violence.
100. U.S. v. Ferguson, 302 F.Supp. 1111, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
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CONCLUSION
It is clear, therefore, that given the constitutional requirements
imposed by O'Brien and Street, physical acts of flag desecration are
"symbolic speech" protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution.
To be sure, acts of desecration are repugnant to the great majority
of American citizens, but there is a vocal element in our society that
seeks and demands certain changes. Laws which are designed to
supress dissatisfaction with the existing order can no longer be
tolerated or justified.
Freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance
is the right to1 differ as to the things that touch the heart of the
existing order. 0 1
JOHN A. BANNERMAN

101. 319 U.S. at 642 (1943).

